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In the late 1940s, Mr. G.W. McLaurin, a Black man, was admitted
to the graduate school at the University of Oklahoma.' Although he had
already received a Master's Degree in education, he aspired to earn a
doctorate in that field as well.' He gained admission to the University
after a federal court found that an Oklahoma law that prohibited Blacks
and Whites from attending public schools together violated the United
States Constitution.' Mr. McLaurin successfully persuaded the federal
court that the statute violated his equal protection rights because there
was no comparable graduate program available for him in the state
university system.4
* Copyright 1997. All rights reserved. Professor, University of Florida College of Law.
This essay builds on ideas that I presented at a faculty workshop here in the Fall of 1996. I
particularly appreciate the suggestions, ideas, and support of my dear friends and colleagues,
Andrea P. Muirhead and Walter 0. Weyrauch. My research assistants, Patricia Duffy and Carter
Andersen, are among the best and the brightest, and I never want them to stop working with me.
1. McLaurin v. Oklahoma St. Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637, 639-40 (1950).
2. Id. at 638.
3. Id. at 639-40. The school authorities were required to exclude Mr. MeLaurin by the
Oklahoma statutes "which made it a misdemeanor to maintain or operate, teach or attend a
school at which both [W]hites and [Blacks were] enrolled or taught." Id. at 638.
4. See id. at 639 (observing that the federal court held that "the State had a constitutional
duty to provide him with the education he sought as soon as it provided that education for
applicants of any other group").
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In response to the federal court order, the Oklahoma legislature
amended the law that prohibited Blacks and Whites from attending
public schools together so that Mr. McLaurin could enroll at the
University of Oklahoma.' However, the amended statute explicitly
provided that any Blacks admitted to a public school should nevertheless
be segregated from the White students.6 The statute further defined
segregation to mean that Black students would be taught in separate
classrooms or at separate times from White students.7 As a condition of
his admission, Mr. McLaurin had to agree that he would comply with
the University President's plans for maintaining segregation within the
University.!
It is difficult to imagine what Mr. McLaurin must have felt as he
went to the University of Oklahoma day after day. He was not allowed
in the classroom where the White students and professors engaged in
intellectual discussions.' Instead, he sat in the anteroom at his designat-
ed desk.'0 When class was not in session, White students had access to
the University's entire library where they could study." Mr. McLaurin,
in contrast, was only allowed to study at his designated desk on the
library's mezzanine. 2 During mealtimes, the White students relaxed
and enjoyed the social time away from the rigors of graduate study.3
They laughed together; they undoubtedly listened to each other's
problems; some of them probably shared life-stories and developed deep
friendships. 4 Meanwhile, Mr. McLaurin was isolated from them in the
cafeteria and sat alone at his designated table. 5 He did not talk to
anyone. 6 He did not share in the laughter and relaxation. 7 He did not
have anyone in which to confide." He had no chance to become
friends with any of his classmates. 9 Mr. McLaurin ultimately could not
5. See id. at 639-40.
6. Id. at 639.
7. Id. at 639 n.1.





13. Cf. id. (noting that Mr. McLaurin had "to sit at a designated table and to eat at a
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experience perhaps the most important factors involved in graduate
education.
The segregation policy at the University of Oklahoma may have
caused Mr. McLaurin to feel anxious and alone. The only source of
affirmation he had at the school on a daily basis was himself. Certainly,
this isolation would cause him to question whether he could succeed in
the University or whether he was as bright and capable as his White
classmates. He may have even considered whether getting the doctorate
degree was worth the pain and humiliation he suffered every day.
Perhaps his community outside of school offered him support and tried
to fortify him for his daily struggles in the all White school, but this
undoubtedly would be insufficient. In school, he was a lone Black man,
tagged by the state of Oklahoma as inferior to his White classmates in
the most visible ways. Thus, because the intra-school segregation policy
treated him unequally, he sued to establish its unconstitutionality.0
In one sense, only Mr. McLaurin could understand the effects of the
segregation policy on his self-esteem, his confidence, his ability, and his
integrity, but in an important way, almost anyone who knew of this
situation could conclude that it was fundamentally unfair to isolate him
from his White classmates because of his race. In this way, perhaps it
is not so remarkable that the United States Supreme Court Justices were
able to see the inequality of it, too. Accordingly, the Court in McLaurin
v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education2' required Oklahoma
officials to abandon the segregation policy and not isolate Mr. McLaurin
from his White classmates.' Consistent with equal protection, Mr.
McLaurin had a right to be integrated into the University of Oklahoma's
graduate program in education.23
Although the McLaurin decision enjoys much less popularity and
receives less attention in the study of Constitutional Law, the McLaurin
decision is in many ways as important as Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion.2 4 McLaurin is important because it raised the fundamental
questions: "What is integration?" and "How is integration related to
racial equality?" It is ironic that the Court struggled with these questions
20. See id. at 638-39.
21. 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
22. Id. at 641-42.
23. See id. at 642.
24. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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four years before de jurez segregation in public schools was held
unconstitutional in Brown.26
Interestingly, the McLaurin Court did not expressly discuss the
concept of integration anywhere in the opinion.' Instead, it focused on
the concept of equality, and held that the segregation policy "handi-
capped" Mr. McLaurin in such a way that he could not receive an
education equal to that of his White classmates. 8 Specifically, the
Court held that the restrictions imposed on Mr. McLaurin by the
segregation policy "impair[ed] and inhibit[ed] his ability to study, to
engage in discussions and exchange views with other students, and, in
general, to learn his profession."29
Although the McLaurin Court did not expressly address integra-
tion,3" the decision helps illuminate what integration means, particularly
in the context of equal protection. Significantly, the McLaurin Court
clarifies that equality is premised on integration and that integration
means more than just having a presence in an institution. The case
highlights the complexities of the concept of integration even though the
concept on its face seems rather simple. Thus, McLaurin is an invitation
to explore the relationship between equality and integration; I accept that
invitation in this essay.
25. De jute segregation (segregation mandated by law) and de facto segregation
(circumstantial segregation) are inextricably linked. The social forces that result in de facto
segregation directly derive from the laws of a society that practiced de jure segregation. For
example, even today many public schools remain racially identifiable, as if Brown were never
decided. See Sharon E. Rush, The Heart of Equal Protection: Education and Race, 23 N.Y.U.
REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 30 (1997). Similarly, property and zoning laws are structured so that
racial segregation persists beyond the constitutional demise of de jure segregation. See Jerry
Frug, Symposium: Surveying Law and Borders: The Geography of Community, 48 STAN. L.
REv. 1047, 1081 (1996). Ending de jure segregation was an important and essential step in
achieving racial equality for Blacks and one must recognize that racial equality is not fully
achieved when involuntary de facto segregation exists. Stated alternatively, integration is a
constitutional component of racial equality.
26. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 (noting that "ftio separate [children] from others of similar
age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their
status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be
undone").
27. McLaurin, 339 U.S. at 638-42.
28. See id. at 641 (observing that Mr. McLaurin's teaching skills and performance would
be adversely affected by segregation from his classmates).
29. Id.
30. See id. at 63842.
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I. UNDERSTANDING INTEGRATION
Integration may seem like a simple concept. It is generally under-
stood that integration means having a mixture of people who possess
different characteristics within a particular group. Legal analysis
generally focuses on integration in two contexts: race and sex. For
example, it may seem that the United States Supreme Court became
racially integrated with the appointment of Justice Thurgood Marshall,
and that, similarly, the Court became integrated on the basis of sex with
the appointment of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor. As the McLaurin
Court implicitly held, however, integration is more complex than a focus
on numbers."
Imbedded in integration is the notion of equality. In the context of
McLaurin, integration meant more than having one person of color in
the student body at the University of Oklahoma; otherwise, the Court
would not have found the intra-school segregation policy unconstitution-
al. Admittedly, without the presence of Mr. McLaurin in the class, the
University would have been racially segregated. Ironically, however, at
the time of McLaurin, de jure racial segregation was constitutional as
long as a state provided separate but equal facilities for Blacks.32
McLaurin exposed the relationship between de jure segregation and
equality even before Brown, raising the question whether it is possible
to have both within the same institution. That is, could the University
of Oklahoma segregate Black and White students who were admitted to
the same programs and still have "equality" as defined by the Constitu-
tion? Given the long-standing constitutional acceptance of the separate
but equal doctrine, it would not have been surprising for the Court to
uphold the intra-school segregation policy in McLaurin. After all, if it
was constitutional to completely isolate Black students in dilapidated
schoolhouses33 and call their education equal to that received by White
children, one could argue that allowing Black students into the White
schools was to take a step much closer to equality even if they were
segregated from the White students within the school.
The fact that Mr. McLaurin was the only Black student in the
University, then, does not alter the Court's analysis. Had there been ten
Black students, they could have provided each other with intellectual
31. See id. at 641-42.
32. See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 631-32 (1950) (mandating the admission of a
Black man to an all-White state law school because there was no "separate but equal" law
school for him to attend).
33. The best historical account of the disparities between Black and White schools is
provided in Richard Kluger's book, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1976).
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discussions. The stigma of sitting at isolated tables throughout the
school would have been reduced for each of them as individuals,
although they would have shared a group stigmatization. Stigma itself,
though, was not a cause for worry to White society under the separate
but equal philosophy in place at the time.34 A group of Black students
also would have created a camaraderie and eased the pain of their
individual segregation. Nevertheless, the McLaurin Court's rationale
would have been the same given that it defined equality as an opportuni-
ty to integrate with the White students." In this way, it should not have
mattered how many Black students were enrolled in the program. Each
one of them would have been entitled to the opportunity to mingle with
the professors, use the libraries, engage in intellectual discussions with
the White students, and enjoy a sense of belonging to the class. The
Black students alone could not have provided themselves with that kind
of sense of belonging at the University of Oklahoma because the
intellectual arena historically belonged exclusively to White students.
Thus, just as having Mr. McLaurin's physical presence at the
University of Oklahoma was necessary to racially integrate the school,
his physical presence alone was not sufficient to racially integrate the
school or to achieve his right to racial equality. Specifically, racial
equality is achieved when people of color and Whites share power in an
integrated environment. Stated alternatively, equality is achieved when
people of color and Whites lay equal claim to a shared environment or
institution. Their shared partnership provides each race with a sense of
belonging to and having the right to participate in controlling the
environment or institution. An important component of a partnership,
naturally, is that all partners share in structuring the rules that govern
the partnership. In this way, integration means much more than
assimilation; integration is not achieved merely by allowing students of
color to have a physical presence in an institution and expecting them
to conform to and identify with White culture.36 They also must have
an equal voice in shaping institutional policy. Thus, equality is related
34. The stigmatic harm inflicted on Blacks as a result of de jure segregation was the
primary reason the Brown Court overruled the separate but equal doctrine of Plessy. See Brown,
347 U.S. at 495.
35. See McLaurin, 339 U.S. at 641-42.
36. Some African Americans claim that Brown was wrong because assimilation was the
main goal of dismantling the separate but equal doctrine. See, e.g., Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Bid
Whist, Tonk, and United States v. Fordice: Why Integrationism Fails African-Americans Again,
81 CAL. L. REv. 1401, 1426 (1993). Assimilation seems to have been the immediate result of
integration policies. See id. However, I do not think Brown has to be read as requiring that.
Rather, I think Brown can and should be read as an opinion that supports racial equality.
[Vol. 48
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to integration in a way that is more complex than a simple understand-
ing of integration based on numbers alone.
Today, most law schools admit a certain percentage of people of
color, they have some faculty of color, and some top administrators also
are of color. Some people would like to have a greater representation of
people of color in the law school communities, but under the simplest
understanding of integration that focuses on numbers, law schools
generally are integrated. However small and inadequate their numbers,
people of color have a physical presence in the law school community.
When I look around my own law school community, however, I
often see racial segregation. Black students congregate in one area of the
cafeteria, Whites students in another, and Hispanic students in yet a
third. The few Asian students sit off by themselves. In addition, I see
White students working in the law review offices. During the interview-
ing season in the fall, I see White students dressed for interviews but
rarely see Black students dressed for interviews because they have fewer
interviews. The hierarchy of power within most law school communities
continues to be top-heavy with White students. These observations are
disheartening and make me wonder whether perhaps society has given
in to the simplest understanding of integration and whether we think we
have satisfied the constitutional mandate of equal protection in the law
school by merely opening the law school doors to students of color.
Surely equal protection and racial equality extend beyond admissions.
Admittedly, the law school does not have a policy prohibiting
students of different races from mingling with each other. These are not
the days of McLaurin. In fact, the McLaurin Court addressed the
possibility that it could lift the ban on de jure segregation within the
University of Oklahoma and that de facto segregation might nevertheless
remain.37 The White students could choose not to associate with Mr.
McLaurin, or Mr. McLaurin could choose to isolate himself from his
White classmates. In either event, the Court held this was not a problem
that called for a legal solution. It was up to the members of the
different racial groups to mingle or not mingle, as they saw fit. In this
way, law students can choose to mingle or choose to stay isolated.
As I read this part of the McLaurin decision, I was only somewhat
persuaded about the role of choice in voluntarily integrating the
school.39 Are the students' choices-Black and White-truly theirs to
37. See McLaurin, 339 U.S. at 641 (acknowledging that the removal of state restrictions
will not necessarily diminish individual and group predilections, prejudices, and choices).
38. Id. (noting that there was a vast difference between state-imposed restrictions
prohibiting "the intellectual commingling of students, and the refusal of individuals to
commingle").
39. Often racism is so pervasive in our society that people of color seek solace in isolation
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make in all situations? Certainly, given the strong social disapprobation
that attached to violating the spirit of Jim Crow laws at the time of
McLaurin, it would have been unlikely that White students would
choose to associate with Black students. Similar adherence to social
protocol also may have kept the Black students at a distance from the
White students. In this way, the McLaurin Court may have been right
that mandating racial integration would be insufficient to overcome the
social compulsion for segregation. However, couching the continuing
segregation as a true choice masks the social influences.
Similarly, the de facto racial segregation of students in law school
communities today may be partially attributable to prior laws and
attitudes,' but it also may be due to current policies that unwittingly
foster the students' respective isolation from each other. In exploring
this possibility, I focus on racial segregation on law reviews, a persistent
problem with respect to Black students at my own law school which
may be a problem for other schools as well. Law review as an institu-
tion enjoys enormous significance in allocating power among students.
The most competitive employers often limit interviewing and hiring
opportunities to law review members.4 Moreover, membership on law
review can make the critical difference to achieving long-term career
goals for some students. For example, most judicial clerks were law
review members. Increasingly, law school professors are selected from
the elite list of judicial clerks. In this way, membership on law review
can have a significant and enduring positive effect on a person's career.
Law review opens up career possibilities that generally are foreclosed
to students who do not join the review.
Given the value of membership on law review to a student's career,
it is important to explore the fairness element in selecting membership
for law review. My purpose in writing this essay, however, is not to
derive the fairest way or even a fair way to select law review member-
from White society to regain their identities. In this way, social isolation is not truly voluntary.
See Nancy A. Denton, The Persistence of Segregation: Links Between Residential Segregation
and School Segregation, 80 MINN. L. REV. 759, 808 (1996) ("ITlhe issue really is whether such
a 'choice' can be called voluntary if it results from a need to escape racism and racists.").
40. See Frug, supra note 26, at 1081, 1088 (discussing the link between zoning laws that
spread during the 1920s and existing residential segregation).
41. Cf. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 179 n.16 (1976) (noting that "[t]he Court has
recognized ... the link between equality of opportunity to obtain an education and equality of
employment opportunity"). But see Emily Campbell & Alan J. Tomkins, Gender, Race, Grades,
and Law Review Membership as Factors in Law Firm Hiring Decisions: An Empirical Study,
18 J. CoNTEmP. L. 211, 233-36 (1992) (reporting that the most important variable in applicant
evaluation was grades because law firms consistently favor students in upper 10% of class as
compared to upper 30% but that law review membership "was not a factor in the decision to
interview or hire an applicant").
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ship; that will take the input of many caring and concerned people of all
races. Rather, my goal is merely to explore the unfairness in existing
selection methods and to suggest that alternative methods can be fairer
to everyone and also promote racial equality. Certainly, as long as law
reviews remain racially segregated, racial equality in law schools
remains elusive because students of color are cut-off from significant
career opportunities. Perhaps this exploration will lead to ideas about
how law school communities can become more integrated in ways that
move us beyond the simplest understanding of integration based on
numbers and move us into the sophisticated McLaurin definition of
integration based on racial equality.
II. LAW REVIEW MEMBERSHIP
Most law schools admit students onto their law reviews in one of
two ways. A certain number of students are automatically eligible for
law review membership because their grade point averages at the end
of their first semester or first year places them at the top of their
class-usually the top five or ten percent.42 An alternative way of
gaining membership onto law reviews at most schools is through a
writing competition sponsored by students already on the review. Each
student who is interested in writing onto the review receives a packet of
materials which forms the basis for a written note to be evaluated by
law review members. Generally, the notes are presented anonymously
for evaluation.
Some schools allow note authors to write letters explaining how they
would bring diversity to the review. Diversity can be defined to include
race, sex, sexual orientation, religion, socio-economic background,
personal disadvantages, culture, or even ideology. The personal letters
are read in conjunction with the notes and membership decisions are
based on a combination of a particular author's writing and analytical
ability as well as the author's ability to bring diversity to the review.
Interestingly, some schools that allow students to write personal
notes as part of the writing competition introduced this into the
evaluative process because their previous admissions process resulted in
the selection of few, if any, students of color. Personal statement
policies increase the likelihood that students of color will become law
review members. In addition, they increase the likelihood that students
from other under-represented groups will be selected for membership.
For example, a White student who demonstrates that he or she has been
42. For example, the University of Florida College of Law currently invites the top 5%
of the first year class to join its law review. The remaining members must gain admission
through an open, anonymous writing competition.
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disadvantaged in law school because the student is blind may convince
law review members that he or she is nevertheless worthy of member-
ship. A Black lesbian may persuade a law review to accept her as a
member because she helps diversify the review in a number of ways,
including her race, sex, and sexual orientation. Naturally, the blind
White student or the Black lesbian may diversify the review from an
ideological viewpoint as well. In this way, individuals do not have to
deny aspects of their identities; rather, individuals can be valued for
different identity traits that make them unique.
Schools that facilitate the admission of under-represented students
onto their law reviews are acknowledging at least two important points.
First, they are acknowledging that having diversity on the review is
important and valuable. Moreover, facilitating the admission of under-
represented groups onto reviews acknowledges that the process of
relying exclusively on grades and anonymous notes alone unfairly
disadvantages some students-generally the students who are most likely
to bring diversity to the reviews. A move away from reliance on grades
and anonymous notes which factors in other indicia of quality would
make the process fairer and more inclusive. For example, a Black
student might be able to add insights into an analysis of an article
focusing on race discrimination that a White student might not see. The
Black student's input would enhance the overall quality of the article
and, hence, the review. Diversity and fairness, then, become the goals
of schools that deviate from standard selection criteria and implement
policies that enhance the likelihood that under-represented groups will
become members of a particular law review.
Ironically, while the goal of fairness motivates some schools to open
up the evaluative process for determining membership on law reviews,
the same goal causes other schools to adhere to the traditional evaluative
process that looks solely at grades and anonymous notes. In other words,
some schools are reluctant to deviate from the traditional selection
criteria for law review membership because they fear that any deviations
would be unfair. Schools that- adhere to traditional criteria for law
review selection also may want to achieve diversity and, in particular,
racial diversity. Nevertheless, their law reviews remain largely racially
segregated because they cannot figure out a fair process to promote
diversity.
At present, then, some law school communities are challenged to
implement law review selection policies that promote diversity and are
also fair. This challenge necessarily involves an exploration of how
reliance on traditional criteria is unfair. Unraveling the unfairness in the
traditional process helps illuminate the reasons why diversity is a
valuable goal and also why non-traditional selection processes are fairer
[Val. 48
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than a reliance on grades and anonymous notes. In turn, this exploration
may result in discovering even more ways in which equitable law
review selections can be made that also promote the valuable goal of
diversity.
Ill. DIVERSITY AND INTEGRATION
Earlier, I defined diversity to include such identity traits as race, sex,
sexual orientation, religion, socio-economic background, personal
disadvantages, culture, or even ideology.43 This list is not meant to be
exhaustive; perhaps there are other ways in which diversity can be
achieved. At some point, however, the concept of diversity must be
finite or it becomes meaningless. Certainly, from a legal standpoint,
diversity is a limited concept and understanding its limits also clarifies
why it is important and even constitutionally compelled.
The concept of diversity became an issue in legal analysis when the
Supreme Court decided Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke." In Bakke, a 5-4 decision, the Court struck down an affirmative
action admissions policy implemented by the U.C. Davis Medical
School to racially diversify its school.45 Specifically, the school set
aside sixteen of one-hundred seats in the entering class for minority
applicants based on race or economic disadvantage.46 Four Justices
struck down the policy as violative of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.' 7 In the concurrence, Justice Powell found that the set-aside
policy denied Mr. Bakke, a White man, his right to equal protection
based on race.4" Among other things, Justice Powell found that, while
race can be a factor in making admissions decisions, it cannot be the
determinative factor.49 Justice Powell suggested that a school could
diversify its classes by looking at a number of characteristics of each
applicant, including race and "exceptional personal talents, unique work
or service experience, leadership potential, maturity, demonstrated
43. See supra text at p. 381.
44. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
45. Id. at 269-71. Davis tried to justify its policy by asserting that members of the targeted
groups were underrepresented in medical school and that their presence was essential to remedy
past societal discrimination, to provide a diverse environment, and to increase the number of
doctors who were likely to provide services to patients within those groups. Id. at 307, 310-11
(Powell, J., concurring).
46. Id. at 289 (Powell, J., concurring).
47. Id. at 421 (Stevens, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Stewart and Rehnquist, JJ.).
48. Id. at 320 (Powell, J., concurring).
49. Id. at 317-18 (Powell, J., concurring).
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compassion, a history of overcoming disadvantage, ability to communi-
cate with the poor, or other qualifications deemed important."
50
Unfortunately, Justice Powell's broad definition of diversity renders
it meaningless in equal protection analysis. Consider an example using
the Court's understanding of diversity. Admissions officials to a state
law school are selecting applicants from among its "hold" category. The
hold category includes files from applicants who were neither automati-
cally admitted nor automatically denied admissions based on their Law
School Admissions Test (LSAT) scores and their grade point averages.
The hold category consists of hundreds, if not thousands of files. The
Committee is deciding whether to admit an applicant who served for
two years in the Peace Corps. No other applicant being considered for
admission to the class has Peace Corps experience.
Justice Powell found that it was permissible for admissions officials
to factor in an applicant's "unique ... service experience" or "compas-
sion." Admissions officials could use the applicant's Peace Corps
experience as a "plus" to admit the applicant over an applicant without
such experience, and this would be constitutional. Moreover, a non-
Peace Corps applicant who is denied admission does not have a
successful suit alleging a denial of equal protection. Because a classifi-
cation based on Peace Corps experience is not suspect or quasi-suspect,
it is rational for the law school to value Peace Corps experience over
non-Peace Corps experience. Similarly, if the applicant with Peace
Corps experience is denied admission to the law school, neither does
that applicant have a successful equal protection suit. Equal protection
simply does not protect the Peace Corps applicant because it is rational
for the school to choose another applicant over the Peace Corps
applicant, even though the Peace Corps applicant would have diversified
the class.
50. Id. at 317 (Powell, J., concurring).
mhe race of an applicant may tip the balance in his favor just as geographic
origin or a life spent on a farm may tip the balance in other candidates' cases. A
farm boy from Idaho can bring something to Harvard College that a Bostonian
cannot offer....
'In Harvard college admissions the Committee has not set target-quotas for the
number of blacks, or of musicians, football players, physicists or Californians to
be admitted in a given year.'
Id. at 316 (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting App. Brief for Columbia Univ., Harvard Univ.,
Stanford Univ., and the Univ. of Penn., as Amici Curiae 2-3) (comparing the U.C. Davis
admissions policy that set aside 16 of 100 seats for minority applicants to Harvard admissions
policy).
51. Id. at 317; see also supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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Diversity is meaningful in equal protection analysis, then, only when
it involves suspect or quasi-suspect classifications. At present, it is clear
that classifications based on race and sex meet this threshold. The
Supreme Court held in Korematsu v. United States52 that laws that
classify on the basis of race must pass the "most rigid scrutiny"; 3 that
is, the government must prove that the law is "narrowly tailored" to
achieve a "compelling state interest" to satisfy the equal protection
guarantee in the Constitution.54 Similarly, the Supreme Court held in
Craig v. Boren" that classifications based on sex must pass intermedi-
ate scrutiny;56 that is, the government must prove that the law is
"substantially related" to an "important government objective" to satisfy
the equal protection guarantee in the Constitution. 7 Perhaps other
groups also should be considered suspect or quasi-suspect holding the
government to a higher standard of review to justify laws that classify
on the basis of those other characteristics.58 Although these arguments
warrant in-depth discussion, they are reserved for another essay. It is
sufficient here to use race and sex to highlight the limitations of
diversity as a meaningful concept in equal protection analysis.
Ironically, constitutional questions about policies designed to increase
diversity generally only arise when the plans define diversity to include
race or sex. The most important diversifying characteristics are subject
to the higher levels of scrutiny to pass constitutional muster. Arguably,
this is consistent with democratic principles that the government should
be held to a high standard when it draws distinctions among people
based on identity traits like race and sex. For example, if the Peace
Corps applicant were also the only Hispanic applicant in the law
school's pool of qualified candidates, we, as a society, should be more
interested in the basis for the school's decision to deny the applicant
admission. A denial of admission raises questions (makes us suspicious)
about possible racial bias and prejudice against Hispanics underlying the
decision. In our system of government, we devalue racial prejudice and
52. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
53. Id. at 216.
54. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995).
55. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
56. Id. at 220 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (observing that the Court had inserted a new
standard between strict and rational basis scrutiny).
57. Id. at 197.
58. For example, perhaps integrating on the basis of sexual orientation, religion, class, or
handicap should be the focus of affirmative action policies. It is difficult to dispute that
including people in these categories in state programs also promotes equality. For an exploration
of this concept in the context of sexual orientation, see generally Sharon E. Rush, Equal
Protection Analogies-Identity and "Passing": Race and Sexual Orientation, 13 HARV.
BLACKLETER L.J. 65, 65-106 (1997).
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
value racial equality. On the other hand, if the Hispanic applicant is
admitted, certainly no question of racial bias arises. We think just the
opposite; that the school values racial equality and affirms Hispanic
applicants.
In fact, by admitting the only Hispanic applicant to the law school,
the law school has taken a step toward racial integration. In this way,
the Hispanic student does not merely diversify the school, he or she
helps integrate the school. This shift from diversity to integration is
enormously significant because the Constitution compels racial
integration and racial equality.59 Thus, it should be easier, not harder,
to justify admitting the Hispanic applicant as a matter of constitutional
law precisely because of the Hispanic student's race.
Bakke minimized the importance of integration in state schools
because of its focus on diversity and not integration.' Each student
brings diversity to a class because each one of us is a uniquely
interesting and valuable individual. Mr. Bakke undoubtedly would have
added something special and different to the U.C. Davis Medical School
as well. Unfortunately, however, his whiteness would have neither
diversified nor integrated the class.
The success of Mr. Bakke's reverse discrimination suit made it more
difficult for state schools to achieve racial equality through integration
because the goal of integration seems to have gotten lost in the quest for
diversity. This is why I have called diversity the red herring of equal
protection analysis; it masks the real purpose behind affirmative action
policies, the integration of state institutions on the basis of race and sex
to achieve equality for people of color and women.
Added difficulties stem from the Court's recent holding in Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena" that all classifications based on race must
pass strict scrutiny.62 This would not be such a daunting task, perhaps,
if the government's purpose behind affirmative action policies was
characterized as trying to achieve race and sex equality through
integration. The Constitution compels the government to provide such
equality, and laws can be implemented that are necessary to achieve that
goal. Affirmative action policies are an excellent example.
In contrast, if the purpose behind affirmative action policies is to
achieve diversity, then clearly the importance of identity traits like race
and sex are going to be trivialized. Diversity can be achieved by
59. See supra text at p.375.
60. See Sharon E. Rush, Diversity: The Red Herring of Equal Protection, AM. U. J.
GENDER & L. (forthcoming 1997) (manuscript at 9-11, on file with author).
61. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
62. Id. at 227.
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maintaining all-White or all-male institutions where the class consists of
a former Peace Corps volunteer, a chocolate ice cream lover, a
swimmer, a Capricorn, a redhead, and persons with any other diversify-
ing traits the admissions officials prefer over Black or female. Nor is
this farfetched. The Court almost fell for this understanding of diversity
recently in United States v. Virginia63 where the Virginia Military
Institute (VMI), the only all-male state college in Virginia, argued that
its all-male admissions policy was justified, and thus constitutional,
because it promoted diversity." In response to this argument, the
majority opinion indicated that if, in fact, VMI had actually been
established for this purpose, it might have been constitutional."
The Court's analysis, however, misinterprets the purpose behind
diversity in education. Had the Court focused on the proper ques-
tion---"Can an all-male state institution refuse to integrate on the basis
of sex without violating the equal protection requirement?"-the analysis
would have addressed the issue of the role of integration in achieving
sex equality. From this perspective, it is unlikely that an actual purpose
of achieving diversity would be able to save an all-male admissions
policy like that in VMI.' Integration on the basis of race or sex, then,
should trump diversity in equal protection analysis.
Although diversity is valuable, it must be placed in context.
Integrating a state program or institution on the basis of race or sex
always promotes diversity. Diversifying a state program or institution,
however, does not always mean that the program will be integrated on
the basis of race or sex. The equal protection guarantee in the Constitu-
tion focuses on protecting race and sex equality and thus, diversity
policies also must focus on integration before considering other
diversifying characteristics. A focus on integration and equality also
highlights why existing selection processes for law review admissions
are unfair.
63. 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996).
64. Id. at 2276.
65. Id. at 2277-79.
66. The question of whether voluntary segregation by women and Blacks in public
institutions is constitutional raises different questions. See Rush, supra note 60, at 13-15.
Voluntary all-women's public institutions and voluntary all-Black public institutions are
constitutional because they promote the equal citizenship rights of historically disempowered
groups (women and Blacks) without diminishing the equal citizenship rights of historically
privileged groups (men and Whites). Id. at 13; see also Johnson, supra note 36, at 1468-70
(discussing the need for Black students to have the choice to attend predominantly Black
colleges so as to prevent assimilation into White culture).
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IV. LAW REVIEW SELECnoN CRITERIA
Some people believe the traditional law review selection crite-
ria-grades and anonymous notes-are objective and the best way to
determine law review membership. Perhaps a high grade point average
is indicative of strong analytical skills. Similarly, a demonstrated ability
to write a comprehensive law review note is evidence of strong
analytical and writing skills. Interestingly, however, a student with a
high grade point average may not be a very good writer, particularly in
the law review context. Moreover, a student can have a keen analytical
mind and not be a very good exam taker, either. In this way, reliance on
only high grade point averages for selection to law reviews may exclude
many students with strong analytical skills and include students with
poor writing skills. At best, traditional selection criteria relying on
grades seem imperfect. They value analytical skills as measured by
grades more than they value analytical skills as measured by another
method, such as oral advocacy skills. Traditional selection criteria also
value analytical skills as measured by grades more than they value
writing skills, otherwise all students who wished to join the review
would be required to write onto it.
But even a prerequisite of demonstrated writing skills consistent with
traditional law review writing style and traditional legal analysis
undoubtedly would eliminate many students whose writing is more
creative and individualistic, both with respect to writing style and with
respect to deviating from traditional legal analysis. For example, a Black
writing competition candidate may write a note that critiques a particular
problem from a critical race theory perspective. Students judging the
quality of the candidate's note undoubtedly consider themselves
objective readers, and they probably are very good judges of strong,
traditional legal writing style and analysis. After all, they have been
successful themselves in learning this way of communicating. Neverthe-
less, if they are unfamiliar with critical race theory, their lack of
knowledge may hurt the Black candidate because the candidate's note
is more easily susceptible to being misunderstood, not understood,
criticized as wrong, or rejected as an illegitimate way of critiquing law.
In turn, the Black candidate may be less likely to gain admission to the
law review because he or she will lose out to students whose writing
style and legal analysis conform to the traditional paradigm. Experience
and history tell us that it is more likely than not that the preferred
writing style will be that of the White student.
My point here is not to suggest that grades or writing should be
irrelevant to law review selection, but only to suggest that reliance on
them is imperfect. Significantly, traditional law review selection criteria
devalue different ways of measuring analytical skills and writing ability.
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Traditional selection criteria exalt traditional legal analysis and writing
style over all other ways of critiquing law. Most importantly, traditional
selection criteria have been unsuccessful in promoting racial equality
because adherence to traditional criteria has left many law reviews
racially segregated. It is reasonable to wonder why the traditional
process that favors the status quo should be preferred over an alternative
process when the alternative process could result in racial integration of
the reviews consistent with equality principles.
Given the importance attached to law review by employers, it is
unfair to adhere to traditional selection criteria that are imperfect and
unfair to students who do not conform to traditional analytical and
writing styles. Many students may be able to identify with this
observation. Students of color especially know the pain of being
excluded from powerful institutions that are populated mostly by
Whites. Thinking of Mr. McLaurin, imagine how students of color
probably feel by their virtual exclusion from law review. Even though
there is no express policy that prohibits them from becoming members
of law review, their inability to participate in meaningful and equal
ways with their White classmates to govern an important aspect of the
law school community undoubtedly demoralizes them. They also are
stigmatized because of their virtual group exclusion from this prestigious
institution. Often they establish their own journals, but the historical
significance of a school's primary law review presents an almost
impossible barrier to secondary journals enjoying equal esteem. Further,
sometimes the existence of specialty journals "excuse" traditional law
reveiws from publishing articles that focus on issues relevant to the
specialty journal. As a result, some articles focusing on issues that are
important to broad audiences may not get as much attention as they
would if the traditional law reviews published them. In this way, even
the issues themselves may be perceived as less important than the issues
that are published in the more traditional review.67
These observations should cause us, as educators, to reevaluate law
review selection criteria. The primary goal of a reevaluation should be
to devise an equitable selection process that results in law reviews that
are integrated on the basis of race and sex, at a minimum. In imple-
menting new criteria, naturally there will be some debate about whether
it is fair to change the criteria. The result of such questions of fairness
67. I thank my friend, Andrea Muirhead, for pointing this out. On many occasions, I have
received offers from a school's secondary journal (dealing with race or sex discrimination) even
though I did not submit my article to the journals. Members of the traditional law review would
automatically refer my articles to the specialty journals, implying that race and sex discrimina-
tion are not relevant to "mainstream" legal analysis.
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tend to translate into resistance to change. Because the concerns about
fairness are multiple, I will focus on three. First, some people might
resist change because they believe that a change will lower qualifica-
tions. Closely related, others might object to changing selection criteria
because students from historically under-represented groups who are
successful in getting onto the review under new standards will be
stigmatized. Specifically, stigma will result because of the popular
perception that the students were not qualified to be on the review under
the arguably more stringent traditional standards. Finally, there are those
who will object because they will feel displaced by a student who makes
it onto law review when they did not, especially when the "displaced"
students would have made it on under traditional criteria.
These concerns need to be addressed if a change to new criteria is
going to be accepted and successful. The qualifications issue is easily
addressed; not even the traditional selection criteria are good predictors
of law review ability. Recall that someone with a very high grade point
average can be a terrible writer. Someone who is a terrible writer may
have a wonderfully creative mind that makes the person a very skilled
researcher or critic of other's writing. At a minimum, new selection
criteria can be devised that are no worse than the existing ones and may
be even better at selecting students who are capable of 'providing an
excellent law review. Importantly, whatever new criteria are devised,
they can be created with the goal of achieving racial equality by
ensuring the law review is integrated.
Stigma is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, the virtual
exclusion of a particular group from a prestigious institution sends a
message that members of that group are unqualified to be a part of the
institution. For example, until the late Thurgood Marshall was appointed
to the Supreme Court, it appeared that no Blacks were qualified to be
Supreme Court Justices. This was also true with the appointment of
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor with respect to the qualification of women
to be on the High Court. Even if Justices Marshall and O'Connor felt
stigmatized by being the first Black and first woman, respectively, on
the Supreme Court, no one would argue that they would have declined
the nominations because the stigma was just too much for them to bear.
On or off the Bench, the stigma problem may have stayed with them.
In fact, the best way for them to dispel popular impressions that Blacks
and women were not qualified to be Supreme Court Justices was to
accept their nominations. Their written opinions in their roles as Justices
remove any doubts that standards were lowered so they could become
Supreme Court Justices. In this way, it is far better to be stigmatized
and a part of the power structure than to be stigmatized and cut off from
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it. The stigma stops becoming a problem only with integration and racial
equality.
Another problem presented in changing law review selection criteria
is the "displacement theory" objection, the "but for the change in
criteria, I would have made it" problem. One way around this problem,
particularly if traditional criteria are merely modified, is to create more
positions on law review to accommodate the need for racial integration.
Everyone who meets the traditional criteria gets on the review, or, stated
alternatively, no one who meets the traditional criteria can argue that he
or she was displaced because of the modified criteria. Still, at the end
of the selection process there is some guarantee the review will be
racially integrated. Moreover, no one who falls to meet either the
traditional or modified criteria can argue displacement. Alternatively, if
the traditional criteria are abandoned following adequate notice of
adoption of new criteria, no one can argue that he or she has been
displaced because everyone is subject to the new standards.
Finally, the fundamental concern about fairness raises this point:
given the imperfections in relying on existing criteria coupled with the
virtual exclusion of racial minorities as a result of relying on existing
criteria, the critical question is not whether it is fair to change but
whether it is fair not to change. Thus, the challenge is to introduce fair
changes that maintain excellence and also promote racial equality.
V. AFFIRMATIVE AcrIoN AND NTEGRATION
Introducing fair changes that promote racial equality raises several
issues. First, does racially integrating law reviews serve a compelling
state interest? Alternatively, given the mandate in Brown to integrate
public education, is there an overwhelmingly compelling reason not to
integrate all aspects of legal education? Finally, even if equal protection
does not mandate racial integration in law reviews, should the public
school system hold itself to a higher standard and racially integrate law
review membership? I will address each of these issues in turn.
In addressing the first issue, recall that the Supreme Court in
Adarand held that race-conscious affirmative action programs must be
subject to strict scrutiny.68 Applying Adarand to a policy favoring
racial minorities in admission to law reviews would thus require a
compelling government interest to survive an equal protection challenge.
Because race discrimination is particularly acute in the field of law, an
affirmative action policy to admit more minorities on law reviews would
certainly be compelling. Moreover, attorneys play an important role in
68. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227; see also supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
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society by protecting individual freedom from government abuse. Thus,
it would seem compelling to include more racial minorities in all aspects
of legal education to ensure that their freedom will ultimately be
protected.
Although the admission of more minorities to law reviews would
further a compelling state interest of integration and racial equality, this
analysis is somewhat limited when examining the desegregation mandate
in Brown more closely. To illustrate this limitation, consider the
Supreme Court's decision in Watson v. City of Memphis.69 In Watson,
Black residents of Memphis commenced an action against the city
"seeking declaratory and injunctive relief directing immediate desegrega-
tion of municipal parks and other... recreational facilities."'7 The
issue was whether the city could "further delay.. . meeting fully its
constitutional obligation under the Fourteenth Amendment to desegre-
gate its public parks and. . . recreational facilities."'" Addressing this
issue, the Court noted that a substantial period of time had passed since
racial segregation by a state institution had been declared unconstitution-
al.72 Moreover, the Court recognized that any deprivation of constitu-
tional rights called for immediate rectification.73 The Court therefore
held that the basic guarantees of the Constitution are warrants for the
"here and now" and, unless there is an overwhelmingly compelling
reason, they must be promptly fulfilled.74
The decision in Watson illustrates the importance of integrating
public facilities "here and now." Affirmative action for law review
membership is not merely serving a compelling state interest. Rather, in
the context of integration, it is a constitutional mandate; unless there is
a compelling reason to continue the virtual exclusion of minorities from
law reviews, law reviews must racially integrate their membership.
While it may be argued that, consistent with Adarand, an affirmative
action program for law review membership must serve a compelling
state interest, I suggest that, under Watson, there must be a compelling
reason not to integrate. Consequently, when viewing an affirmative
action policy for law reviews as integration and racial equality rather
than diversity, it becomes apparent, in light of Watson, that there must
be a compelling state interest to continue segregation in law review
membership.
69. 373 U.S. 526 (1963).
70. Id. at 528.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 529-30.
73. Id. at 532-33.
74. Id. at 533.
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I suggested earlier in this essay that the challenge for law school
communities is to introduce fair criteria in law review selection that
maintain excellence and also promote racial equality.7" The Supreme
Court recently acknowledged in United States v. Fordice76 a similar
challenge faced by Mississippi's public universities where the Court
noted that standardized entrance exams could be used in unfair ways. In
Fordice, students at predominantly Black universities in Mississippi
alleged that the state had failed to dismantle its dual university system
for Black and White students in violation of their equal protection rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment.' Historically, Mississippi used
scores on the American College Testing Program (ACT) to determine
eligibility for admission to its state universities and colleges.78 Auto-
matic admission to three of the four predominantly White institutions
required an ACT score of 15 or higher.79 Automatic admission to the
other predominately White institution required an ACT score of 18.0
The district court found the "discriminatory taint" of these requirements
obvious because when the ACT requirements initially were adopted in
1963, "the average ACT score was 18 for Whites and was 7 for
Blacks."" State officials took advantage of racial disparities in ACT
scores to set cut-off scores for automatic admission to the predominately
White universities so as to exclude most Blacks. 2 As a practical
matter, then, most Black applicants were deemed "unqualified" for
admissions to the predominantly White colleges and had no choice but
to attend a predominantly Black college. 3
In 1985, Mississippi's university system remained largely segregat-
ed.84 Admissions officials continued to place determinative weight on
ACT scores for admission to the predominantly White universities,
knowing that seventy-two percent of Whites but less than thirty percent
of Blacks achieved this score." The Court held that continued reliance
solely on ACT scores to set automatic admissions requirements was
traceable to adoption of the original admissions policy. Because the
75. See supra text at p.382.
76. 505 U.S. 717 (1992).
77. Id. at 723. They also alleged violations of their Fifth, Ninth, and Thirteenth
Amendment rights as well as Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id.




82. See id. at 734-35.
83. See id.
84. See id. at 735 (noting that, at the time of the opinion (1992), Mississippi's universities
remained "predominantly identifiable by race").
85. See id.
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automatic admissions policy still had segregative effects, the Fordice
Court ordered admissions officials to look at other indicia of a student's
ability to succeed. 6
Despite findings that most standardized test are biased, many people
responsible for evaluating applicants for employment opportunities or
educational programs continue to rely on them, sometimes accounting
for the built-in biases and sometimes discounting them.87 In much the
same way, employers in the field of law look to law review membership
to meet hiring needs. Like the disparity in ACT scores among Black and
White students, the disparity in law review membership has led to
pervasive segregative effects in career opportunities for Black and White
law students.
Although the Supreme Court has held that a disparate impact alone
is not sufficient to support an equal protection challenge,8 the Fordice
Court acknowledged that discriminatory intent can be inferred from
previous ill-motivated policies that have not changed. 9 A possible link
might exist between public law schools that historically functioned under
de jure segregation and those schools that continue to have de facto
segregation within the institution, particularly in significant areas like
law reviews. More important, perhaps, is the possibility that educational
institutions should hold themselves to a higher standard than is required
by finding discriminatory intent. If the goal in education is to achieve
racial equality as mandated in Brown, then integration and racial
equality in all aspects of education become necessary. Given the high
degree of reliance on law review membership by employers to meet
86. Id. at 737-38. The Court noted that placing more weight on students' grades would
result in the admission of more Black students to the predominantly white colleges. Id. at 737.
The Court noted that "the disparity between black and white students' high school grade
averages was much narrower than the gap between their average ACT scores, thereby suggesting
that an admissions formula which included grades would increase the number of black students
eligible for automatic admission to all of Mississippi's public universities." Id. In addition, the
Court relied on information provided by the American College Testing Program, the organization
that administers the ACT, which discourages reliance on ACT scores as the sole criterion for
college admissions. Id.
87. Rush, supra note 25, at 15-16.
88. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246 (1976) (adopting an "intent" requirement
to show a constitutional infringement in disparate impact cases). In Davis, Black plaintiffs
challenged the constitutionality of the police department's reliance on a standardized exam to
qualify for positions in the department. Id. at 237. Black applicants were four times more likely
to fail the test than were White applicants. Id. The Court held that the disparate impact alone
on Black applicants was not sufficient to establish a constitutional violation; they also needed
to show that the department intended to discriminate against them by relying on the exam. Id.
at 237, 248.
89. Fordice, 505 U.S. at 743.
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hiring needs, Blacks cannot compete equally in the field of law with
their White counterparts until they are included in law review member-
ship. Moreover, White lawyers dominate most of the prestigious law
firms, intensifying the discrimination racial minorities face. In light of
this, the focus on whether law reviews can constitutionally exclude
racial minorities from membership seems misplaced. Rather, the
question should be whether educational institutions condone the virtual
exclusion of racial minorities in one of the most important aspects of a
legal education.
The answer is simple. Education forms the foundation for each
individual to achieve success. It also shapes the way individuals
perceive themselves and others. If educational institutions continually
permit Blacks to be excluded from the prestige of law reviews, they
essentially set a standard that segregation is permissible in some areas
of public education. Such a virtual exclusion of Blacks from law review
membership effectively undermines the Brown Court's principle of racial
equality in public education. The public school system should therefore
set an example and support integration and racial equality in all aspects
of public education.
VI. CONCLUSION
This essay is an invitation to readers to join in an effort to devise
equitable plans for integrating our law schools. The schools that allow
personal statements to accompany students' law review notes have taken
a step in the right direction. Perhaps consideration should be given to
automatically admitting a certain number of racial minorities based on
grades or the writing competition. There are many possibilities.
Moreover, whatever steps are taken to integrate law reviews, consider-
ation should also be given to integrating all the other areas of law
schools: moot court, student representation, secondary journals, the top
ten percent of the class, and so forth. Mr. McLaurin could not be
accepted as a full member of his graduate school program so long as he
was unable to mix with his White colleagues and professors in
meaningful ways.' ° Similarly, as members of the law school communi-
ty, we, each need to facilitate the commingling of our White students
and our students of color. This is the only way in which racial equality
can be achieved. Our White students and our students of color need an
equal partnership; they each need to be able to lay claim to this law
school as their law school. If we are successful in promoting integration
at all levels throughout the schools, then perhaps the students will be
90. See supra text at pp.373-78.
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truly free to socially mingle with each other. When we look around,
then, we will see integration and the hope for true racial equality.
